That
was always the obstacle. The financial people were conservative - all they
could think of was that immense sum they owed the bank - and their instinct
about any new venture was reflexively negative. To their mind the company was
already stretched too thin, too many new factories were being built, there was
too little cash, and America remained an uncertain world dominated by
automotive giants. Only Ishihara, an Ishihara living in Tokyo instead of New
York, could handle them. His requests were not the requests of some difiant,
lowly manager who had gone native in America and who was probably trying to
create his own empire at Nissan's expense; these were the requests of one of
their own, a man of profit. He knew all the numbers, all the games that the
financial people played, and he had their trust. Because Katayama was living in
America: he was perceived as alien. Every time he challenged Tokyo, it was
additional proof that he was more American than Japanese. Ishiaara's word would
be trusted as Katayama's would not. Ishihara was acutely aware of this. Once,
early in the course of the American venture, during a visit to the California
offices he took Katayama and Nobe Wakatsuki, the trading company executive who
in 1957 had urged Nissan to send cars to the Los Angeles auto show, to dinner.
The question of Tokyo's reluctance to accept suggestions from America hung
heavily in the air that night. It was very hard to make Tokyo respond to
American needs, Ishihara said. "I am the only one who can do it, who can
push it through," he told them, "and I can do it only from Tokyo.
Always remember that."
?
There
was soon ample evidence of it. Nissan capitalized the American company at $1 million.
To the Japanese that seemed an enormous amount of money. There were strict
governmental limits on how much a company could spend overseas. They were sure
$1 million would last five years. But America turned out to be a terribly
expensive place. Breakfasts at a hotel could cost the unwary traveler several
dollars. Advertising on radio and television was like burning money. Even
arranging dealerships turned out to cost money, for lawyers were expensive.
Nothing was cheap in this country. There was no way to save. Within two years
there was only $100,000 left from the original $1 million. In late 1962
Ishihara went back to the board, hat in hand, and asked for another $500,000.
They had, he acknowledged, spent more rapidly than anyone had anticipated, but
doing business in America had proved far costlier than imagined. He had done
everything he could to save, but it was impossible to save in the Japanese
sense of that word. If they held back now, the American company would come to a
complete stop, and Nissan would have to retire from the American market, which
meant in effect from the export market.
?
When
he made his presentation at the board meeting, there was no real challenge to
him. The board voted the money rather readily and he felt very little heat. But
the American operation continued to be costly, and results remained hard to
come by. A year later he had to go back and ask for another $500,000. This time
he knew he was going against the wishes of the board. Some board members
suggested he had been careless and that for so much money there ought to be
more to show. Ishihara replied politely that he was still confident they could
attain their objective, that Nissan could make a car that would do well in the
American market. Again he repeated what he believed, that if Japan was to have
any world export market in autos, it had to prove itself in America, against
the best. But they had all underestimated how expensive starting out in America
was. He was positive that if they held on a little longer they would succeed.
Indeed, he was willing to bet his career on it. If we don't make it with this request
he added, I will resign from the company. When he made that promise, no one, he
noted, tried to talk him out of it.
?
The
eyes on him at the meeting, he thought, were as cold as stone, and he could
even see a small amount of pleasure in the faces of some potential adversaries.
The board again gave him $500,000, but it left no doubt that he was not to come
back again, and that his promise should be a serious one. If he failed, he might
as well quit, for he would have no future at Nissan.
?
It
was, he often reflected later, a very close call. In 1964 the company began to
show a profit, about $200,000. Years later, when Ishihara was president of
Nissan and was frequently congratulated on the brilliance of Nissan's
performance in America, he was always mildly amused, for he knew how near they
had come to failure.
?
David
Halberstam "The Reckoning" (1987)
